2018 Sumner Canary Memorial Lecture: State Courts in a Federal System by Larsen, Honorable Joan L.
Case Western Reserve Law Review
Volume 69 | Issue 3
2019
2018 Sumner Canary Memorial Lecture: State
Courts in a Federal System
Honorable Joan L. Larsen
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev
Part of the Law Commons
This Front Matter is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Law Review by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University
School of Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
Honorable Joan L. Larsen, 2018 Sumner Canary Memorial Lecture: State Courts in a Federal System, 68 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 525 (2019)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev/vol69/iss3/3
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 69·Issue 3·2019 
525 
State Courts in a Federal 
System 
Honorable Joan L. Larsen† 
Contents 
Introduction .................................................................................. 525 
Part I ............................................................................................. 526 




This lecture was established to honor the memory of Judge Sumner 
Canary.1 Judge Canary spent a good deal of his time in the state court 
system. He was also United States Attorney,2 so he spent some time in 
the federal system. I have something in common with Judge Canary, in 
that I too have served in both systems. I currently serve on the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, but before that I had the 
honor of being a Justice of the Michigan Supreme Court. That is what 
I want to talk to you about today. 
Recent years have witnessed a renewed interest in state courts and 
their relationship to their federal counterparts. For example, my 
colleague on the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, Judge Jeff Sutton, has 
recently published an excellent book on state constitutional law 
entitled, 51 Imperfect Solutions: States and the Making of American 
Constitutional Law.3 His book, which I will discuss in more detail later, 
argues that state courts play a critical, though underappreciated, role 
in our national judicial system. I just learned today that he will be here 
later this academic year to discuss the book. It is an excellent book. 
But I will also offer a bit of a dissent in advance, so when Judge Sutton 
comes here, you can ask him what he thinks about my partial dissent. 
 
†  Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. 
1. The Sumner Canary Memorial Lecture, Case W. Res. Univ., https:// 
law.case.edu/Academics/Centers-and-Institutes/Center-for-Business-Law-
and-Regulation/Sumner-Canary-Lecture [https://perma.cc/2THZ-G8T2] 
(last visited Mar. 27, 2019) (Judge Larsen’s Sumner Canary Memorial 
Lecture was delivered at the Case Western Reserve School of Law on Sept. 
25, 2018).  
2. Id. 
3. Jeffrey S. Sutton, 51 Imperfect Solutions: States and the 
Making of American Constitutional Law (2018). 
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With those things in mind, I would like to offer some of my 
perspectives on the relationship between state and federal courts. I 
thought I would first tell you a little bit about my transition from the 
state bench to the federal bench and some things I noticed right away. 
Next, I would like to comment on the importance of state courts in our 
federal system and the important ways in which they can operate to 
improve justice in America. I will also offer a few thoughts about their 
limits. Lastly, I will wrap up with a few thoughts about how my 
experience as a state court judge has influenced the way I do my current 
job as a federal appellate judge. 
Part I 
 First, let me share a bit about my transition from state to federal 
court. I am often asked: what are the differences between serving as a 
Justice on a state’s highest court and serving in the federal system as a 
mere intermediate appellate court judge? Before I begin, I should say 
that, of course, I can only speak of my own experience. Someone that 
serves on a different court, the Ohio Supreme Court, or any other, 
might have a different view. But from my experience, I noticed three 
things right away. 
The first thing I noticed is that it is an election year, and I am not 
on the ballot. In Michigan, as in Ohio, we elect our judges, although 
the Governor holds the power to appoint judges to fill vacancies that 
arise between elections.4 That was my situation. I was appointed to the 
Michigan Supreme Court in the fall of 2015 to fill a vacancy. Under the 
Michigan Constitution, a judge appointed to fill a vacancy must stand 
in the next state-wide general election.5 For me, that election was in 
the fall of 2016 and I am delighted to say that I won my first—and 
last—election for public office. 
So for starters, there are often differences in how one gets a seat on 
a state court as opposed to a federal court. Almost half the states use 
some form of election to select their high court justices.6 Obviously, the 
federal selection process, consisting of nomination and Senate 
confirmation, is quite different. I cannot comment on current 
controversies, so I will not dwell long on this subject. I will pause only 
long enough to note two things. First, there must be some form of 
democratic input in the process of selecting our least majoritarian 
branch of government. And second, there will always be disagreement 
over what form that democratic input should take—whether that be 
election or appointment, and within those broad categories, just  
4. See Mich. Const. art. VI, §§ 2, 23; see also Ohio Const. art. IV, § 6. 
5. Mich. Const. art. VI, § 23. 
6. See Methods of Judicial Selection, Nat’l Ctr. for St. Cts., http:// 
www.judicialselection.us/judicial_selection/methods/selection_of_judge
s.cfm?state [https://perma.cc/X9CC-9FNL] (last visited Feb. 4, 2019). 
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precisely what the details ought to be (contested elections, retention 
elections, confirmation processes, or the like). There is no perfect 
solution to the problem of selecting who will sit in judgment of our 
laws, our leaders, and ourselves. We can only ask that the process be 
transparent and that the process be fair. 
Having been appointed and confirmed through the federal selection 
system, one of the first things I noticed when I arrived at the federal 
court of appeals is that my colleagues are really far away, and they 
change all the time. The judges of the Sixth Circuit, which comprises 
the states of Tennessee, Kentucky, Ohio, and Michigan, are 
geographically dispersed. We have our chambers in our home states 
(and often in different cities within those states) and come together 
only to hear oral argument in Cincinnati. And when we go to 
Cincinnati, we sit in rotating, randomly-selected three-judge panels. 
The first of these features (geographic dispersion) is not a feature 
of all federal appellate courts—the D.C. and Federal Circuits are 
notable exceptions—but it is a feature of most of them. And it affects 
the way the court operates more than I had anticipated. Before I came 
to the Sixth Circuit, I had some form of experience inside three courts: 
I had been a law clerk on the D.C. Circuit; a law clerk on the United 
States Supreme Court; and then a Justice of the Michigan Supreme 
Court. And what all those courts have in common is proximity. The 
judges and the law clerks are regularly in one building. 
Some say that familiarity breeds contempt, but that was not my 
experience. I found it incredibly useful as a law clerk to be able to walk 
down the hall and puzzle through a tricky legal question with clerks 
from other chambers who were working on the same case. Our work 
was hard, and we were fresh out of law school. Having the benefit of 
those different perspectives helped me help my judge. And that was 
made easier because we were physically together. As a justice of the 
Michigan Supreme Court, I found this equally true. My work was made 
better by the chance to discuss hard problems with my colleagues face-
to-face and one-on-one. 
Before I arrived at the Sixth Circuit, I was concerned that 
geographical dispersion might hamper the judges’ ability to have 
meaningful discussions about legal topics. But I have been pleasantly 
surprised by the willingness of my colleagues to discuss cases. Although 
I am new to the court, my colleagues have been very welcoming, and 
we all seem to get along quite well. But our distance from one another 
does present challenges. It means that we have to make more of an 
effort to keep open those lines of communication. We cannot discuss a 
case in the hallway or over coffee or lunch because we are not together. 
So our communication often must take a more formal tone. We 
exchange memos, write emails, or pick up the phone. But there is a 
little barrier when you cannot just walk down the hall. You have to 
think more precisely about what you are going to say. I cannot decide 
if that is a benefit or a detriment. Obviously, it is always good to think 
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carefully about what you are going to say next. And having to pick up 
the phone, write an email, or send a memo produces that result. But 
on the other hand, those casual one-on-one interactions often gave me 
some of my best ideas. There is not much we can do about geographic 
dispersion. It is a feature of appellate courts that cross state lines, and 
it has its costs. But it also has the benefit of bringing together a group 
of judges with diverse backgrounds, reflecting the legal communities of 
the various states that make up our circuit. 
A different, but related, way in which the federal courts of appeal 
differ from their state counterparts is that the panels, by design, are 
constantly changing. When we go to Cincinnati to hear arguments, we 
typically hear arguments over four days. And in the course of those four 
days, we will sit on two different panels. That means that in any given 
court week, I will sit with four different judges; and the next month it 
will be a different four; and so on. The process of drawing judges is 
random, so sometimes there are repeat players, which means that it 
could take many months, or even years, before I will have served on a 
panel—even once—with each of my judicial colleagues. 
By contrast, supreme courts—state and federal—always sit en 
banc. And what that means, as a judge, is that you quickly get to know 
your colleagues, both as jurists and as people. That facilitates the 
exchange of ideas, not only in the informal way occasioned by proximity 
that I mentioned before, but also in the sense that when you sit together 
repeatedly, you learn what to expect. Different judges have different 
styles for argument and opinion writing. Some judges, for example, like 
to ask the first question, and others the last. Figuring out how to insert 
oneself into the argument and to adapt one’s own style to facilitate 
conversation is easier in a court that convenes with the same five, seven, 
or nine actors each time. 
The last thing that I noticed instantly upon arriving at the Sixth 
Circuit is the difference in the docket. In federal appellate courts, appeal 
is by right. That means that our court resolves every case that is 
presented to us—from the most jurisprudentially significant cases that 
will establish precedent for years to come, to cases in which the law is 
largely settled and, so the dispute, while incredibly important to the 
parties before the court, will not likely make a lasting mark on the 
fabric of the law. By contrast, on the Michigan Supreme Court, as with 
the United States Supreme Court and many state high courts, appeals 
are by leave only. And so, the judges not only have to decide the cases 
before them, but they also have to decide what to decide. That work 
occupied a great deal of our time. 
As with any court that has a discretionary docket, broader 
considerations come into play when deciding which cases to hear. We 
would think about things like: whether the legal question at issue was 
unsettled in our state; whether we could clarify an area of the law that 
had caused problems throughout the state; or whether new legislation 
might have affected some of our old rulings. Put simply, on the 
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Michigan Supreme Court, we could not fix every error that came our 
way. We had to focus on the cases that presented broader issues that 
would affect the state as a whole. 
As a result, the cases we heard on the Michigan Supreme Court 
almost always presented a legal puzzle. If we had decided to hear a 
case, it was generally because something about the law needed 
correction or clarification. On the Sixth Circuit, we also get cases that 
are legally challenging—plenty of them. But we also hear cases that 
present no legal mysteries. These cases might not be legally challenging, 
but they are nonetheless hard in that they involve the painstaking work 
of reading through a record to make sure that the district court, or the 
agency, or whoever the initial decisionmaker was below, got the case 
right by appropriately applying the facts within the confines of a legal 
regime that is largely settled. These are not always the most glamorous 
cases. But to the people and the entities involved, they are just as 
important. It matters a lot in the real world—to the claimant and to 
the taxpayer—whether, for example, Mrs. Smith was wrongfully denied 
disability benefits. It also matters a lot in the real world—to the 
defendant, to law enforcement, and to the citizenry—whether there was 
probable cause to support Mr. Jones’s arrest. So on the federal appellate 
court, it is our job to fix every error. That is a different role, and it is 
not one that is less important, than the role of a state’s high court. 
For better or worse, the federal courts seemed to have captured 
more of the public’s imagination than their state counterparts. And, of 
course, what we do matters a great deal. Because the United States 
Supreme Court hears so few cases, the federal courts of appeal are the 
courts of last resort for most federal litigants. But I am not sure whether 
as many people appreciate the significance of state supreme courts. 
These courts not only shape and form the common law, but they also 
bear the truly tremendous responsibility of being the final say on the 
interpretation of state statutes and state constitutions. And it is this 
work that I want to discuss next. 
Part II 
So why does the day-to-day work of state courts matter? It seems 
like most media coverage is of the federal courts, and in particular, the 
United State Supreme Court. Why should we pay attention to the work 
of state courts? 
The first reason is that state courts directly affect people’s lives. 
Judge Sutton noted in his recent book that “by one count, 95 percent 
of the disputes resolved by courts in this country are filed in the state 
courts, as opposed to the federal.”7 That count makes sense because the 
kinds of disputes that ordinary people might have with one another 
typically sound in tort, contract, or real property—quintessential state 
 
7. Sutton, supra note 3, at 184. 
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law topics. Moreover, most criminal law, and nearly all family law, are 
still the province of the states. To the extent that these subjects are 
common law subjects, the state courts are the law-developers (even if 
the cases end up being tried in federal court); to the extent that 
legislatures have a hand in these areas, state legislatures, not Congress, 
are the dominant players, the expansion of the Commerce Clause 
notwithstanding. And state courts, of course, have the final say on the 
interpretation of state legislative acts. So just in terms of sheer volume, 
state courts are where the action is. 
Judge Sutton’s new book points out another way in which state 
courts matter—they can be “innovators” or “dissenters” from the 
federal regime.8 This is true in a few ways. One is that, often, state law 
need not conform to federal law. Judge Sutton focused his attention on 
state constitutional law, and I will say a few words about that. But 
there are other ways in which state courts need not follow in lock step 
with their federal brethren, even when confronting similar problems. 
State courts can thus “dissent” from the federal model and perhaps 
provide useful experience to inform a larger discussion. 
One example that comes to mind concerns Chevron deference.9 Of 
course, the underlying dispute over Chevron deference is whether, and 
how much, it is appropriate for the judiciary to defer to an 
administrative agency’s interpretation of the law and whether giving 
such deference impermissibly divests courts of the judicial power.10 
Much has been said recently on this topic, and I am not here to enter 
the fray. But I note that this is an area in which some state courts have 
gone another way. That includes Michigan. In a case called In re 
Complaint of Rovas against SBC Michigan,11 the Michigan Supreme 
Court held that agency interpretations of statutes were entitled to 
“respectful consideration,” but that courts still retained the primary 
responsibility for interpreting statutes according to their plain 
language.12 As a result, Michigan courts are untethered from an 
administrative agency’s interpretation of a statute and instead conduct 
de novo review of the statutory interpretation questions presented to 
them. And a recent decision of the Ohio Supreme Court suggested that 
Ohio’s high court is likewise interested in the question whether state 
 
8. Id. at 21. 
9. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
10. See Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1155–56 (10th Cir. 2016) 
(Gorsuch, J., concurring). 
11. 754 N.W.2d 259 (Mich. 2008). 
12. Id. at 262. 
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agencies should be given Chevron-type deference for their 
interpretations of the law.13 
The point is not to praise or condemn Chevron deference. Instead, 
my point here is that there are all sorts of ways in which state courts 
may accept, reject, or tinker with federal doctrine. And this might 
provide data to, and inform a larger national discussion about, an 
important legal topic. 
As I mentioned at the outset, there has lately been renewed interest 
in the states as laboratories of constitutional law. Judge Sutton’s book 
on this topic, 51 Imperfect Solutions, is an excellent look at the history 
of state constitutional law and offers a superb discussion of some of the 
events that have kept state courts from developing the constitutional 
law of their states. The book also offers some intriguing ideas about 
what courts and litigants might do going forward to give state 
constitutions their own meaning, distinct from the federal Constitution. 
I cannot think of a better author for such a book than Judge Sutton, 
who has served over fifteen years as a federal appellate court judge and 
who previously served as Solicitor General of Ohio. His experience, as 
a federal judge and a state court litigator, makes him eminently 
qualified to speak on this topic. 
For those who have not had an opportunity to read the book, it is 
an in-depth exploration of the role of state constitutional law in our 
nation’s constitutional history. He explains how states have set both 
negative and positive examples that have affected the development of 
constitutional law. The book does this by exploring four specific areas 
of the law: school funding, the exclusionary rule, compelled sterilization, 
and mandatory flag salutes. It then offers thoughts about how state 
constitutional law might be taken more seriously, focusing on what 
judges, attorneys, state bars, and law schools can do to give state 
constitutional law a more prominent voice in the discussion of 
individual constitutional rights. Judge Sutton believes that “an 
underappreciation of state constitutional law has hurt state and federal 
law and has undermined the appropriate balance between state and 
federal courts in protecting individual liberty.”14 Judge Sutton raises 
many thought-provoking points: too many to address in this lecture. 
But I thought I would share a few thoughts in response to some of his 
ideas about the future of state constitutional law. 
Judge Sutton’s book is, in large part, a quest to figure out why 
state constitutions do not receive as much attention as their federal 
counterpart and what can be done to correct that—to encourage 
litigators to include the state constitutions as part of their litigation 
strategy, and perhaps a source of rights protection for individuals. Early  
13. State ex rel. McCann v. Del. Cty. Bd. of Elections, 118 N.E.3d 224, 231 
(Ohio 2018) (DeWine, J., concurring); id. at 234 n.2 (Kennedy, J., 
dissenting). 
14. Sutton, supra note 3, at 6 (emphasis omitted). 
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in his book, Judge Sutton states that if the reader doubts the conclusion 
that state constitutions have taken a back seat to the federal 
Constitution, he or she should “[a]sk a state court judge about the 
frequency with which claimants raise federal and state constitutional 
challenges to state or local laws and the seriousness with which they 
raise the state claims (if they raise them at all).”15 
I am that judge. During my time on the Michigan Supreme Court, 
arguments that the Michigan Constitution protected different rights or 
protected the same rights differently than the United States 
Constitution were few and far between. On the rare occasions in which 
such arguments were raised, they usually amounted to little more than 
throw-away arguments. Counsel might end a brief or argument by 
saying, essentially: “In conclusion, if you find that the federal 
Constitution does not require this, then you should find that the state 
Constitution does.” End of argument. 
This was somewhat surprising, as the Michigan Supreme Court has 
a history of showing some willingness to rule solely under its state 
Constitution. The most well-known example is a case called Sitz v. 
Department of State Police.16 There, the Michigan Court of Appeals 
held that sobriety checkpoints violated the Fourth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution.17 The Michigan Supreme Court denied 
leave to appeal that decision, which meant that the intermediate 
appellate court ruling remained in place.18 The United States Supreme 
Court granted certiorari and reversed, ruling that the checkpoints did 
not violate the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.19 
On remand, the Michigan Court of Appeals, in what some perceived as 
a bold move for an intermediate appellate court, held that although the 
sobriety checkpoints may have been permitted by the United States 
Constitution, they nevertheless violated the analogous search and 
seizure prohibition in the Michigan Constitution.20 The Michigan 
Supreme Court later affirmed that decision.21 
Sitz does not mark the only time the Michigan Supreme Court has 
held that the Michigan Constitution provides broader protection than 
its federal counterpart. In a case called County of Wayne v. Hathcock,22 
 
15. Id. at 9. 
16. 429 N.W.2d 180 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988), rev'd sub nom. Mich. Dep't of 
State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990), aff’d sub nom. Sitz v. Dep’t of 
State Police, 506 N.W.2d 209, 210 (Mich. 1993).  
17. Id. at 185. 
18. Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 448. 
19. Id. at 455. 
20. Sitz v. Dep’t of State Police, 485 N.W.2d 135, 139 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992). 
21. Sitz, 506 N.W.2d at 210. 
22. 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004). 
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the Michigan Supreme Court addressed a question that would come 
before the United States Supreme Court the very next year.23 The 
United States Supreme Court case, with which many of you may be 
familiar, was Kelo v. City of New London.24 In that case, the United 
States Supreme Court held that the Takings Clause of the United States 
Constitution did not prohibit a state from using its power of eminent 
domain to take private property from one individual and give it to 
another pursuant to an economic “redevelopment plan.”25 The 
redevelopment plan in that case was to take people’s homes in one area 
of the city in order to allow other private parties to put the land to 
“commercial, residential and recreational uses” that would perhaps 
revitalize the area.26 The United States Supreme Court held that the 
redevelopment plans constituted a “public use” for purposes of the 
Takings Clause.27 
Just one year earlier, the Michigan Supreme Court had confronted 
the same issue under its own constitution and had come to the opposite 
conclusion. Condemning private homes in order to allow other private 
entities to build a “large business and technology park with a conference 
center, hotel accommodations, and a recreational facility” was not, 
according to the Michigan Supreme Court, a “public use.”28 The United 
States Supreme Court took note of the Hathcock decision when it 
decided Kelo but was not persuaded.29 It did, however, emphasize the 
role that state constitutions could play in providing greater protections 
for the property rights of its citizens.30 
Despite this apparent willingness on the part of the Michigan 
Supreme Court to consider arguments that the state Constitution 
provides more, or different, protection than its federal counterpart, 
meaningful arguments to that effect were nearly nonexistent during my 
time on that court. And as Judge Sutton points out, failing to argue for 
rights protection on both state and federal constitutional grounds might 
be a serious disservice to one’s client, who could be forfeiting an avenue 
to victory.31 
Yet, I also want to dissent a bit from an implicit charge that might 
flow from this exploration of the possibilities of state constitutional law. 
That is the charge that state supreme court justices, as a whole, might  
23. Id. 
24. 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
25. Id. at 488–90 (citing U.S. Const. amend. V). 
26. Id. at 483–85. 
27. Id. at 489–90. 
28. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 770–71, 788. 
29. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 489 n.22. 
30. Id. at 489. 
31. Sutton, supra note 3, at 19. 
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not have done enough in the way of what Judge Sutton calls “rights-
innovating.”32 And here I should make clear that Judge Sutton himself 
does not levy this charge or take a position on this topic. 
To introduce this idea, I should state what you likely already know: 
state constitutions can only grant rights more generous than those 
protected by the federal Constitution.33 Since the late 1960’s, by which 
time the Supreme Court had largely completed the task of incorporating 
most Bill of Rights protections against the states,34 federal rights 
guarantees have pre-empted any less-generous state analogue.35 So any 
work to be done by state constitutions in the area of individual rights 
would have to consist of granting protections where the federal 
Constitution might be thought to fall short. That is likely why Judge 
Sutton refers to state constitutions, and their state judicial interpreters, 
as having the potential to be “rights innovators.”36 
But, even presuming that there are areas in which the federal 
Constitution could use some assistance, it is not clear to me that it is 
appropriate for state judiciaries, as opposed to other institutions, to be 
the primary innovators. Certainly, judges must take seriously any state 
constitutional challenge that is brought before the court and must 
consider the real possibility that their state charter might grant broader 
protections than are afforded by existing interpretations of the federal 
and state constitutions. But, at the same time, I do not believe Judge 
Sutton to be advocating that state judges invent more extensive rights 
from thin air. 
That, then, puts front and center the question of interpretive 
method. To make the question a little more concrete, I ask myself: what 
tools would I have used as a Michigan Supreme Court Justice to figure 
out whether a litigant was entitled to additional protections under the 
Michigan Constitution? What legal sources would I have looked to? If 
we want judges to deploy the traditional tools of constitutional 
interpretation—the big three being text, history, and precedent—then 
we have to ask ourselves first, how available these sources will be as 
they pertain exclusively to state constitutional law, and second, how 
likely they will be to yield an answer that is both different and more 
generous than the analogous federal constitutional right. 
Sometimes, of course, the text will just be different; there are 
written provisions in many state constitutions that have no federal 
analogue. Some state constitutions, for example, contain “single 
 
32. Id. at 21. 
33. See id. at 14–15, 63.  
34. See McDonald v. City of Chi., 561 U.S. 742, 763–66 (2010).  
35. Sutton, supra note 3, at 12–15.   
36. Id. at 19.  
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subject” rules.37 Some grant affirmative rights that are not textually 
guaranteed by the federal Constitution—the right to education being a 
prominent example.38 But often, state rights mirror federal rights—or 
in older states, it is the other way around, as federal Bill of Rights 
protections were often modeled on the rights protected in the pre-
existing state constitutions.39 So, if a state judge is faced with a text 
that replicates, or closely tracks, the text of the federal constitutional 
right, she must ask herself: what are the chances that this language 
means something different? It might, of course. But if we are talking 
about a cognate provision—particularly one worded nearly identically 
or using a legal term of art (i.e. ex post facto)—then there is a decent 
argument that when the federal Constitution borrowed the phrase from 
the state constitution, or vice versa, the drafters and ratifiers of the 
borrowing constitution would have understood the provision to have 
the meaning that it had in the original document. That is likely why 
the constitution used a borrowed term, instead of saying something 
different. And if that is right, we would not expect to see divergence in 
state and federal constitutional meaning. 
Of course, it could be that the provisions shared the same original 
meaning, but the judges of one court or another later strayed from that 
meaning in the course of deciding cases. If the federal judges were the 
ones to stray, then we might see room for state courts to correct the 
error. But, of course, state courts can only correct errors that fall in one 
direction; they can only be more generous than the federal 
constitutional right. And here I am a little bit skeptical that there are 
many state constitutional rights that are being under-enforced relative 
to both their original meaning and to the interpretation given to their 
federal cognates. That is because, as Judge Sutton explains in his book, 
it was “the States’ relative under-protection of individual rights” that 
lead the Supreme Court to incorporate the federal bill of rights against 
the states in the first place.40 
There are exceptions, of course. The example of the Hathcock and 
Kelo cases I just mentioned is a good one. There, the Michigan Supreme 
Court interpreted the phrase “public use” according to its original 
public meaning in the Michigan Constitution and concluded that its 
meaning was narrower than the one the United States Supreme Court 
would ascribe to its federal counterpart the next year in Kelo. But I am 
not sure how often a similar pattern will obtain. 
What if you do not buy the premise of the argument I have just 
outlined? What if you think that judges ought not limit themselves to 
the traditional tools of constitutional interpretation but instead should 
 
37. See, e.g., Mich. Const. art. IV, § 24. 
38. See, e.g., Mich. Const. art. VIII, § 2. 
39. See Sutton, supra note 3, at 8. 
40. Id. at 14 (emphasis added). 
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seek to infuse the constitution with contemporary meaning? That is a 
viewpoint popular among some judges, law students, and members of 
the academy when it comes to interpreting the federal Constitution. 
But that view rests largely on two pillars that are not always, or 
perhaps even often, found in state constitutions, as opposed to their 
federal counterpart. The first of these pillars is that constitutions are 
old; and the second is that they are nearly impossible to amend through 
democratic processes. 
As to the first, yes, some state constitutions are old. As mentioned 
previously, the federal Constitution borrowed most of the Bill of Rights 
from rights protected in the state constitutions that pre-dated it.41 And 
a few of those state constitutions still govern their citizens today. 
Massachusetts, for example, is still governed by its Constitution of 
1780.42 Scholars have claimed that the document is the “oldest 
functioning written constitution in the world.”43 But, of course, that is 
not the condition of all our states. Both Alaska and Hawaii came into 
the Union only in 1959,44 and Hawaii governs under a Constitution 
adopted in convention even more recently, in 1978.45 Other states too 
have adopted new constitutions in conventions of relatively recent 
vintage. Michigan, for example, although granted statehood in 1837, 
has remade its Constitution several times, most recently in 1963.46 
Georgia’s Constitution of 198347 is one of the nation’s youngest 
constitutions, even though Georgia was the fourth state admitted to 
the Union.48 Although by no means exhaustive, these few examples 
illustrate that at least some state constitutions are both younger and 
easier to amend than the federal Constitution. 
Indeed, in nearly half the states, including Michigan and Ohio, the 
people themselves can play a direct role in amending their state  
41. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
42. See Wheatley v. Sec’y of the Commonwealth, 792 N.E.2d 645, 648 (Mass. 
2008); see also S.B. Benjamin, The Significance of the Massachusetts 
Constitution of 1780, 70 Temp. L. Rev. 883, 884 n.5 (1997). 
43. Lawrence M. Friedman & Lynnea Thody, The Massachusetts 
State Constitution 3 (2011). 
44. Act of July 7, 1958, Pub. L. 85-508, 72 Stat. 339 (establishing Alaska as 
a state); Act of Mar. 18, 1959, Pub. L. 86-3, 73 Stat. 4 (establishing Hawaii 
as a state). 
45. See State ex rel. Anzai v. City & Cty. of Honolulu, 57 P.3d 433, 435–36 
(Haw. 2002). 
46. See People v. Nutt, 677 N.W.2d 1, 11 (Mich. 2004). 
47. Georgia’s latest constitution was ratified in November 1982 but went into 
effect on July 1, 1983. See Googe v. Fla. Int’l Indem. Co., 422 S.E.2d 552, 
554 n.7 (Ga. 1992); Carpenter v. State, 297 S.E.2d 16, 17 (Ga. 1982). 
48. Andrew Glass, Georgia Enters the Union: Jan. 2, 1788, Politico (Jan. 
1, 2017, 11:28 PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2017/01/georgia-
enters-the-union-jan-2-1788-233087 [https://perma.cc/T8KA-82SJ]. 
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constitutions through the initiative process.49 This means that if the 
citizens of such a state are unhappy with the rights or protections 
provided by their constitution, they have a direct means to change it. 
You are probably familiar with the many significant measures that have 
recently been added to Ohio’s constitution through initiative, including 
provisions regarding minimum wages, crime victims’ rights, and 
redistricting.50 My state too has used this form of direct democracy to 
amend its constitution in significant ways.51 I am not here to take a 
position on these initiatives or even to comment on the merits of direct 
democracy as a form of constitutional amendment. I only note that 
when thinking about how judges should interpret a state constitution, 
one needs to consider the whole landscape. Even if one adheres to the 
so-called “living Constitution” school of thought when it comes to 
interpreting the United States Constitution, it does not plainly follow 
that the approach is suited to the interpretation of state constitutions, 
which may be both younger and more amenable to democratic change. 
Conclusion 
I thought I would conclude with some thoughts about how my time 
serving on a state court has influenced my thinking about the role of a 
federal judge. It probably comes as no surprise that my state court 
experience comes into play most often when we are exercising 
supplemental or diversity jurisdiction and, therefore, applying state law 
in federal court. Serving on a state court has heightened my 
appreciation of and respect for the ways in which each states’ law may 
differ. When applying state law under supplemental or diversity 
jurisdiction, a federal judge should be careful not to step on the toes of 
another sovereign. 
There are a few ways that a federal judge can exercise caution when 
reviewing state law. The first is just to try to get a handle on the 
nuances of state law. There is sometimes a tendency in the legal 
profession to think of “the common law” as a monolith. That is more 
or less how we teach the common law in law school. Your torts book, 
for example, probably included a collection of cases on discrete topics—
say, for example, proximate cause or premises liability—that were 
pulled from a variety of jurisdictions. They were chosen by the casebook 
editor or your professor because they illustrated a concept and maybe 
because their facts were memorable. But in most law schools these days, 
 
49. Initiative and Referendum States, Nat’l Conf. of St. Legislatures, 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/chart-of-the-
initiative-states.aspx [https://perma.cc/988F-UBAY] (last visited Feb. 4, 
2019). 
50. See Ohio Const. art. II, § 34a (minimum wage); id. art. I, § 10a (crime 
victims’ rights); id. art. XI (congressional redistricting). 
51. See, e.g., Mich. Const. art. I, § 26 (affirmative action restriction). 
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you likely were not taught the particular tort law of Ohio, Michigan, 
or Tennessee. Instead, you learned basic ideas about tort law, and you 
probably did not pay that much attention to where the cases came 
from. That is how I learned torts anyway. And that is probably the 
way we need to teach law in a legal climate that is mobile and 
increasingly national. We need to teach the broad concepts and let 
practitioners learn the nuances as they settle into a locality. 
The trick as a federal judge, who deals with the law of many states, 
is not to forget that there likely are nuances to learn. I think my 
experience serving on a state court has made me more sensitive to the 
need to understand the subtleties of the various states’ law. Of course, 
I will not always get it right. But I do think that my experience on the 
state court has made me more attentive to the search for details than 
I might have been otherwise. 
This is also a good thing to remember for those of you in the 
audience who are litigators or would-be litigators. The lawyers who 
regularly practice in a state are often our best guides to those nuances 
of state law. So, as a litigator who may practice both in state and federal 
court, please do not assume that the federal judges will already be 
familiar with the unique aspects of the governing law in your state. 
Please use your experience and expertise to educate us and help us do 
our jobs. 
Sometimes, of course, state law will be truly unsettled. When 
federal courts encounter an unresolved area of state law, they need to 
be particularly careful. After all, state courts should have the primary 
responsibility for deciding questions of state law. There are a few 
solutions to the problem of unsettled state law. The first is the 
certification process. The Supreme Court has encouraged certification 
when federal courts are faced with novel state law questions, noting 
that certification puts the state law question “directly to the State’s 
highest court, reducing the delay, cutting the cost, and increasing the 
assurance of gaining an authoritative response.”52 Another reason in 
support of certification is that it “helps build a cooperative judicial 
federalism.”53 Certification allows the federal courts to respect the 
state’s ability to interpret and control its own state law, permitting 
those sitting on the state’s highest court, who presumably have the best 
understanding of the law within their state, to address new legal 
questions first.54 
Certification, however, is not without its own wrinkles. First of all, 
it may slow things down. Secondly, some states are unwilling or unable 
to answer certified questions. For example, there is a dispute on the 
Michigan Supreme Court about whether the Michigan Constitution 
 
52. Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 76 (1997). 
53. Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 390–91 (1974). 
54. Arizonans, 520 U.S. at 76. 
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permits it to answer certified questions from federal courts.55 But to the 
extent the certification procedure is available, it seems to me that we 
should be amenable to using it in order to respect the rights and abilities 
of the states to control the interpretation of their own laws.56 
When certification is not available or practical, a federal court may 
have to determine, on its own, what a state court would do when faced 
with an unanswered legal question. If we have to do that, the Sixth 
Circuit caselaw says that we “must make the best prediction, even in 
the absence of direct state precedent, of what the [state’s highest court] 
would do if it were confronted with [that] question.”57 Here, we need to 
be careful. We need to make sure that we are stepping into the shoes 
of the state’s highest court, rather than stepping on its toes. If we 
incorrectly predict the result could be that we have a law of Ohio that 
obtains in federal court and a law of Ohio that obtains in state court. 
The litigators among you know that that will lead to rampant forum 
shopping—at least until the matter is brought back to our attention so 
we can bring the question in line with state court decisions. 
Reviewing state law as a federal judge is inevitable. But exercising 
caution, whether that be by certifying the truly unsettled questions to 
the state court, or just by paying attention to the nuances of state law, 
federal judges can respect the rights of the state courts, as independent 
sovereigns, to interpret their own laws in accordance with the 
constitutional design. 
 
55. See, e.g., In re Certified Question from U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit, 885 N.W.2d 628, 634 (Mich. 2016) (Young, C.J., 
concurring); In re Certified Questions from U.S. Court of Appeals for 
Sixth Circuit, 696 N.W.2d 687, 687 (Mich. 2005). 
56. See Lindenberg v. Jackson Nat. Life Ins. Co., 912 F.3d 348, 371 (6th Cir. 
2018) (Larsen, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
57. Combs v. Int’l Ins. Co., 354 F.3d 568, 577 (6th Cir. 2004) (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Managed Health Care Assocs., Inc. v. 
Kethan, 209 F.3d 923, 927 (6th Cir. 2000)). 
